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In Defense of the Harmless Error Rule’s
Clear and Convincing Evidence
Standard:
A Response to Professor Baron
Mark Glover*
Abstract
In Irresolute Testators, Clear and Convincing Wills Law,
Professor Jane Baron draws attention to a conflict between the
mechanics of the law of wills and the realities of testation. Baron
observes that the law of wills is designed to be used as a tool by
resolute and rationale testators to communicate their intent
regarding the distribution of property upon death. However, the
law’s archetypical testator does not represent the many real
testators who are irresolute and irrational, those possessing
incoherent and only partially formed thoughts regarding the
disposition of their estates.
Based upon the disconnect between the law’s paradigm of
resolute will-making and the irresoluteness of testation in the real
world, Baron argues that reforms that have given probate courts
discretion to correct mistakes in testation do not function
appropriately. For instance, Baron argues that the harmless error
rule, which allows courts to excuse defects in a testator’s
compliance with will-execution formalities when the testator’s
intent is established by clear and convincing evidence, does not
meaningfully limit probate courts’ discretion to correct mistakes.
Specifically, she argues that many courts are concerned with not
only the technical mistakes of resolute testators but also the more
troubling mistakes of irresolute testators, and consequently, these
courts overreach the boundaries of the harmless error rule.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Wyoming College of Law;
LL.M., Harvard Law School, 2011; J.D., magna cum laude, Boston University
School of Law, 2008.
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This essay acknowledges Baron’s insight regarding the
tension between the law and reality but questions whether this
tension renders the harmless error rule and its clear and
convincing evidence standard ineffective. More particularly, this
essay argues that, despite potential overreaching by some courts,
the clear and convincing evidence standard likely operates in the
way that reformers intended and that the harmless error rule
represents an improvement upon the conventional law of willexecution.

In her insightful new article, Irresolute Testators, Clear
and Convincing Wills Law,1 Professor Jane Baron sheds
light on an often overlooked tension between the law of wills
and the realities of testation. She suggests that the law
“contemplates a coldly rational, choosing testamentary self
for whom wills rules are a means for furthering selfdetermined
ends.”2
However,
she
observes
that
“many . . . testators . . . do not seem to correspond to th[is]
model.”3 “These testators,” Baron explains, “cannot bring
themselves to make final decisions about their property”;4
instead, they “have ambiguous, fluid intentions.”5 The law’s
paradigmatic testator, who is unerring, rational, and
resolute, therefore stands in stark contrast to the many real
testators, who are erring, irrational, and irresolute.
To illustrate the law’s model testator, Baron focuses on
the issue of will-authentication.6 Under the conventional
1. Jane B. Baron, Irresolute Testators, Clear and Convincing Wills Law,
73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2016).
2. Id. at 8.
3. Id.
4. Id. For a discussion of why recognition of one’s mortality might make it
difficult for the testator to make estate planning decisions, see Mark Glover, A
Therapeutic Jurisprudential Framework of Estate Planning, 35 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 427, 434–38 (2012). For a discussion of how will-execution formalities
might alleviate the emotional toll of death anxiety, see generally Mark Glover,
The Therapeutic Function of Testamentary Formality, 61 U. KAN. L. REV. 139
(2012).
5. Baron, supra note 1, at 29.
6. Baron also devotes attention to the issue of correction of mistaken
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law’s rule of strict compliance, probate courts distinguish
authentic wills from inauthentic wills by relying solely upon
a set of prescribed formalities.7 If a will is written, signed by
the testator, and attested by two witnesses, the court
determines that the testator intended the will to be legally
effective.8 Conversely, if a purported will does not comply
with these formalities, the court determines that the
testator did not intend the will to be legally effective.9 Thus,
the conventional law envisions a decisive testator who
carefully and deliberately uses the formalities of willexecution to communicate her fully formed intent to the
probate court.
The law has retained its assumption of resoluteness in
reforms to the way it authenticates wills. Whereas under
conventional law, probate courts conclusively presume that
the testator did not intend a noncompliant will to be legally
effective, the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) recognizes the
harmless error rule, which grants courts discretion to
overlook will-execution errors.10 In the small minority of
terms in wills. See id. at 14–15 (discussing one argument that “the law should
be prepared to correct the error if the error is proved to a high degree of
certainty”).
7. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND
ESTATES 153 (9th ed. 2013) (discussing wills formalities).
8. See Mark Glover, Minimizing Probate-Error Risk, 49 U. MICH. J. L.
REFORM 335, 363–66 (2016) (explaining that under conventional law, compliance
with the prescribed formalities is not conclusive evidence of a will’s
authenticity).
9. See id. at 343 (“When the court applies the rule of strict compliance, it
invalidates a will if the testator failed to comply with any of the prescribed
formalities.”).
10. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (2010)
Although a document or writing added upon a document was not
executed in compliance with [the prescribed formalities], the
document is treated as if it had been executed in compliance . . . if the
proponent of the document or writing establishes by clear and
convincing evidence that the decedent intended the document or
writing to constitute . . . the decedent’s will . . . .
The precursor to the UPC’s harmless error rule was Professor John Langbein’s
substantial compliance doctrine. See generally John H. Langbein, Substantial
Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1975) (discussing the
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jurisdictions that has adopted the UPC’s reform,11 when the
testator leaves behind a will that does not comply with the
prescribed formalities, the court can consider extrinsic
evidence that suggests the testator’s noncompliance was the
product of mistake and that she truly intended the will to be
legally effective.12 Simply put, the harmless error rule
transforms the conventional law’s conclusive presumption
into a rebuttable one.13
The harmless error rule maintains the law’s paradigm
of resoluteness, as it assumes that the testator had a fixed,
fully formed intent but simply failed to communicate that
intent in the way the law dictates. Although the reform
acknowledges that a testator might err in the way she
communicates her intent, it does not contemplate a testator
whose intent was amorphous or uncertain. As Baron
summarizes, the harmless error rule is designed to correct
only the “technical, innocuous errors” that the law’s model
testator makes;14 it “do[es] not address or remedy [the]
irresolution” of actual testators who do not conform to the
law’s archetype.15
Drawing upon this tension between the law’s resolute
testator and reality’s irresolute testator, Baron critiques the
harmless error rule and probate courts’ application of it.
doctrine).
11. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 7, at 184 (listing California,
Colorado, Hawaii, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, Ohio, South Dakota, Utah,
and Virginia as adoptees).
12. See Glover, supra note 8, at 383–84 (“[T]he UPC allows the court to
excuse harmless formal defects when evidence suggests that a decedent
intended a noncompliant document to constitute a legally effective will.”); see
generally John H. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors in the Execution of Wills:
A Report on Australia’s Tranquil Revolution in Probate Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
1 (1987) (discussing the harmless error rule as developed in Australian courts).
13. See Mark Glover, Rethinking the Testamentary Capacity of Minors, 79
MO. L. REV. 69, 100–01 (2014) (suggesting that a “law reform movement” is
underway that would allow probate courts to take independent evidence of
testamentary intent into account).
14. Baron, supra note 1, at 7.
15. Id. at 26.
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Specifically, she takes aim at the clear and convincing
evidence standard that is embedded within the rule. Under
the rule, the court’s discretion to correct will-execution
errors is limited to situations in which the testator’s intent
is established by clear and convincing evidence.16 Although
this evidentiary standard is not clearly defined, it requires
greater certainty than the fifty-one percent that is required
under the preponderance of the evidence standard, which is
typically used in civil litigation, but less than the near onehundred percent certainty that is required under the
criminal law’s reasonable doubt standard.17 When applied
in the context of the harmless error rule, the clear and
convincing evidence standard directs the probate court to
overlook a will-execution error only when it is fairly certain
that the testator intended a noncompliant will to be legally
effective.
The clear and convincing evidence standard is meant to
serve as a limit on the court’s discretion to excuse willexecution defects. The official comments to the UPC’s
harmless error rule explain: “By placing the burden of proof
upon the proponent of a defective instrument, and by
requiring the proponent to discharge that burden by clear
and convincing evidence . . . , [the harmless error rule]
imposes procedural standards appropriate to the
seriousness of the issue.”18 In essence, the procedural
safeguard of the clear and convincing evidence standard
restricts the cases to which the court’s discretion applies to
only those in which the testator’s mistake is clear. Under
conventional law, the probate court had no discretion to
excuse will-execution defects, and therefore no limitation
was needed. Once the law grants courts discretion, however,
policymakers must decide how great that discretion should
16.
17.
18.

UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (2010).
Glover, supra note 8, at 399–400.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 cmt.
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be. In this regard, the proponents of reform believed that
limiting the court’s discretion through the clear and
convincing evidence standard would serve two important
functions: (1) it would appropriately allocate the risk of
incorrect determinations of a will’s authenticity; and (2) it
would minimize litigation regarding the authentication of
wills. Baron doubts whether the clear and convincing
evidence standard meaningfully serves either of these
functions.
The first important function that reformers intended
the clear and convincing evidence standard to serve is the
allocation of risk between an erroneous finding of
authenticity and an erroneous finding of inauthenticity. The
harmless error rule’s primary goal is to prevent the
invalidity of clearly authentic wills due to technical formal
defects.19 The idea is that courts can judge the authenticity
of wills based upon extrinsic evidence and can thereby avoid
incorrect determinations of inauthenticity. However, once
courts are granted the discretion to evaluate the
authenticity of wills, the possibility arises that they will
exercise that discretion incorrectly.20 In particular, the
harmless error rule presents the risk of two types of error.
First, a false-negative outcome is produced when the court
fails to exercise its discretion to excuse a formal defect
when, in fact, the will is authentic. Second, a false-positive
outcome is produced when the court exercises its discretion
to overlook a formal defect when, in fact, the will is
inauthentic.21 Recognizing the possibility of both types of
error, proponents of reform anticipated that the clear and
convincing evidence standard would guide courts to excuse
19. See Glover, supra note 8, at 388 (“[The harmless error rule] grants
probate courts the discretion to excuse will-execution errors related to the
attestation requirement.”).
20. See id. at 384 (“[P]robate courts will not always correctly judge the
authenticity of a noncompliant will.”).
21. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 7, at 153 (describing falsenegatives); Glover, supra note 8, at 338 (defining false-positives).
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will-execution errors in the most obvious cases of mistake
and to avoid exercising their discretion in more difficult
cases.22 In this way, the clear and convincing evidence
standard allocates risk of error between false-positive
outcomes and false-negative outcomes.
Although Baron acknowledges that the clear and
convincing evidence standard might play a role in sorting
harmless errors from more problematic errors,23 she
questions whether considerations other than clear and
convincing evidence are driving the decisions in some cases.
Specifically, Baron suggests that “[i]t seems possible that
the testators’ conformity to the will-making paradigm is
more important . . . than the evidentiary standard.”24 She
notes that the cases in which courts seem most willing to
excuse will-execution defects involve testators who had a
clearly formed intent regarding the disposition of property
after death and who largely complied with the formalities of
will-execution.25 Thus, the more similar a testator is to the
law’s unerring, rational, and resolute archetype, the more
likely the court is to excuse a will-execution defect.26 Based
upon this correlation, Baron observes, “[I]f these facts are
determinative, it’s hard to see what work the clear and
convincing standard is doing.”27
Baron correctly perceives the connection between the
22. See Glover, supra note 8, at 400 (“[T]he higher standards of proof could
encourage courts to use their best efforts to correctly decide the issue of a will’s
authenticity . . . .”).
23. See Baron, supra note 1, at 33 (contrasting two cases and suggesting
that “the clear and convincing evidence standard does seem to be doing some
important work in both cases”).
24. Id. at 55.
25. See id. at 54–55 (stating that many cases “ultimately turn on whether
the evidence of the decedent’s intent with respect to the document in question is
clear and convincing”).
26. See id. at 55 (“Paradoxically, the closer the testator conforms to the
paradigm, the less careful the courts seem to be about openly confronting
evidentiary weaknesses.”).
27. Id.
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law’s paradigmatic testator and the harmless error rule, but
she incorrectly concludes that conformity to the paradigm is
altogether unrelated to the harmless error calculus and the
clear and convincing evidence standard. In particular, the
level of formality that the testator’s defective will displays is
integral to the operation of the harmless error rule. Instead
of courts wholly ignoring the testator’s attempted willexecution when applying the harmless error rule, reformers
anticipated that the degree to which the testator complied
with the prescribed formalities would itself serve as
evidence of the testator’s intent.28 Therefore, the level of
formality of the testator’s attempted will-execution is
inversely related to the amount of extrinsic evidence that
probate courts need to excuse a will-execution defect. More
drastic deviations from the prescribed will-execution process
necessitate greater extrinsic evidence of intent, and lesser
deviations require less extrinsic evidence. The UPC
expressly acknowledges this connection, when it suggests
that “[t]he larger the departure from [the prescribed]
formality, the harder it will be to satisfy the Court that the
instrument reflects the testator’s intent.”29 Thus, the
correlation between a testator’s conformance with the law’s
will-execution paradigm and a probate court’s willingness to
excuse a will-execution defect is entirely consistent with
how reformers envisioned the harmless error rule and its
clear and convincing evidence standard would operate.
The second important function that reformers intended
the clear and convincing evidence standard to serve is the
suppression of litigation. Once probate courts are granted
discretion to overlook formal defects, the concern arises that
proponents of noncompliant wills will flood the courts with

28. See Langbein, supra note 12, at 52 (“The larger the departure from the
purposes of Wills Act formality, the harder it is to excuse a defective
instrument.”).
29. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 cmt. (2010).
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harmless error litigation.30 In turn, the cost of
overburdening the probate system could outweigh whatever
benefits the harmless error rule might produce. The
proponents of reform envisioned that the clear and
convincing evidence standard would limit the court’s
discretion to such an extent that litigation rates would
remain low. In particular, by placing a relatively high
burden on the proponent of a defective will, reformers
intended the clear and convincing evidence standard to
weed out frivolous litigation involving little chance of
success.31
Like her critique of the allocation of risk function,
Baron’s take on the clear and convincing evidence
standard’s role in suppressing litigation is more skeptical
than critical. Baron points out: “There is no way to ascertain
whether the [reported] cases are typical of disputes arising
around wills generally or mistaken wills particularly. It is
possible that the reforms are working as their proponents
expected, deterring litigation in all but the most contested
cases.”32 Implicit in this statement is that it is also possible
that the clear and convincing evidence standard is not
deterring litigation. Baron’s point is that whatever the
reported cases suggest about the rates of harmless error
litigation, we do not know what impact the harmless error
rule has had on the probate system in general.
Baron is right to point out that the reported cases do
not give us a clear picture of the numerous unreported cases
that flow through the probate system each year.
30. See Mark Glover, Decoupling the Law of Will-Execution, 88 ST. JOHN’S
L. REV. 597, 631 (2014) (“[B]y channeling all valid wills into substantially the
same form, the strict compliance requirement minimizes the court’s discretion
in evaluating the genuineness of wills and consequently increases certainty
regarding which wills are valid and which are not. The increased certainty
suppresses litigation involving formal wills . . . .”).
31. See Baron, supra note 1, at 22–23 (noting that a higher standard of
proof deters potential plaintiffs from bringing suits based on insufficient
evidence).
32. Id. at 28.
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Nonetheless, it is possible to dive into unreported records
that are located in probate courts across the country. And
although there is certainly more empirical probate research
to be done,33 the initial results are promising for harmless
error advocates. For instance, in a recent empirical study of
probate records from Alameda County, California, Professor
David Horton examined 571 cases of decedents who died in
2007.34 California enacted its harmless error rule during the
time period covered by Horton’s research, and consequently,
harmless error litigation rates could not be measured using
the entirety of Horton’s sample.35 The portion of the
sampled cases that overlapped the enactment of the
harmless error rule, however, produced no instances of
harmless error litigation. Horton explains, “I did not
uncover a single litigant who attempted to invoke the rule—
a finding that might belie doomsday claims about harmless
error overburdening courts.”36 As Baron correctly points out,
even if the rates of harmless error litigation are low, we do
not know for certain that the clear and convincing evidence
standard is the mechanism that is deterring litigation.37
33. See generally Thomas E. Simmons, Wills Above Ground, 23 ELDER L.J.
343 (2016).
34. See David Horton, Wills Law on the Ground, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1094,
1120–22 (2015) (finding that low harmless error litigation rates comports with
the experience of other jurisdictions); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (2010) cmt.
(“Experience in Israel and South Australia strongly supports the view that a
dispensing power like [the harmless error rule] will not breed litigation.”).
35. See Horton, supra note 34, at 1139
California lawmakers approved the bill that authorized harmless
error on July 1, 2008. At that time, 138 (24 percent) of the estate in
my spreadsheet had closed. By January 1, 2009, when the statute
became effective, that number had grown to 293 (51 percent). Thus,
my date provide a partial glimpse of the relevant period.
36. Id.
37. See Baron, supra note 1, at 28–29 n.115
The reformer claim that the clear and convincing evidence standard
would deter trivial litigation assumes that potential contestants,
familiar with the newly-reformed law, will decide whether or not to
litigate based on a rational assessment of their chances of prevailing.
[However,] [t]here is little empirical evidence to support the claim
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Nevertheless, it is also true that we do not know that the
clear and convincing evidence standard is not the driving
force behind low litigation rates. Thus, at the very least,
Horton’s research suggests that it is possible that the clear
and convincing evidence standard is serving its intended
purpose.38
Whatever skepticism Baron might have regarding the
effectiveness of the clear and convincing evidence standard
in limiting the exercise of discretion by courts that are
committed to applying the harmless error rule as reformers
intended, her primary criticism of the standard involves the
application of the rule by courts that are concerned about
both technical will-execution errors and non-technical
mistakes. In particular, Baron argues that the clear and
convincing evidence standard does not serve its restrictive
purpose because the harmless error rule does not account
for the irresoluteness of everyday testators. She observes
that, “[t]he clear and convincing evidence standard
addresses only the technical errors of the self-reliant
choosing testamentary self. But at least some courts care
also about the more complicated errors of the vulnerable,
irresolute testamentary self. These courts push against the
reforms’ boundaries.”39 Put differently, Baron argues that
probate courts sometimes exercise discretion that falls
outside the bounds of the harmless error rule because they
want to correct the inattentiveness and indecisiveness of
irresolute testators in addition to the technical errors of the
resolute. Based upon this overreaching, Baron concludes
that “the clear and convincing evidence standard has not,
that decisions of prevailing at trial, as opposed to intensity of feelings
based on family circumstances.
38. See Simmons, supra note 33, at 362 (“Functionalists predicted that
allowing imperfectly executed wills when a heightened burden of proof was met
would result in a flood of litigation. Professor Horton’s sampling overlaps
California’s adoption of the harmless error rule, but he found no contests
involving the harmless error rule. So much for . . . a flood.”).
39. Baron, supra note 1, at 8.
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and will not, function as a serious limit on mistake
correction.”40
Baron’s point is well taken. It is true that courts have
not applied the harmless error rule consistently and within
the bounds that reformers intended.41 But what is not as
clear is how problematic this inconsistency and
overreaching is. First, Baron acknowledges that the corpus
of harmless error case law is limited due to the rule’s
infancy.42 Therefore, it is entirely possible that, as courts
gain greater familiarity with the harmless error rule and
experience with its application, judicial restraint and
decisional consistency will develop. Even if it continues,
however, the overreaching about which Baron is concerned
does not necessarily indicate that the harmless error rule’s
clear and convincing evidence standard is failing to
constrain courts in the exercise of discretion. Indeed,
without the clear and convincing evidence standard, probate
courts might step outside the bounds of the harmless error
rule even farther than they do now.
But regardless of whether the clear and convincing
evidence standard is in some way serving its restrictive
purpose, the most important question is whether the
overreaching that is occurring is tolerable. More
particularly, the issue is whether a harmless error rule with
nebulous bounds is preferable to the conventional law’s rule
of strict compliance. Because the overarching goal of the law
in this area is to fulfill the testator’s intent,43 this question
40. Id.
41. See Mark Glover, A Taxonomy of Testamentary Intent, 23 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 569, 603–11 (2016) (providing examples of the inconsistent application of
the harmless error rule).
42. See Baron, supra note 1, at 28 (“The universe of case law is not
particularly large.”).
43. See Robert H. Sitkoff, Trusts and Estates: Implementing Freedom of
Disposition, 58 ST. LOUIS L.J. 643, 644 (2014) (“[T]he American law of succession
facilitates, rather than regulates, the carrying out of the decedent’s intent. Most
of the law of succession is concerned with enabling posthumous enforcement of
the actual intent of the decedent or, failing this, giving effect to the decedent’s
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should be answered by evaluating which method of willauthentication fulfills the intent of testators to the greatest
extent at an acceptable rate of litigation. In this regard,
proponents of reform have persuasively argued that the
harmless error rule is better than the rule of strict
compliance in fulfilling the testator’s intent,44 and, as
explained previously, the initial research suggests that the
reform does not increase litigation rates.45 To be clear, this
does not suggest that the harmless error rule as applied by
overreaching courts is the best mechanism for fulfilling the
intent of both resolute and irresolute testators.46 Instead, it
simply means that the reform is preferable to the
conventional law.
It is also worth noting that the type of overreaching
about which Baron is concerned should not be surprising.
As explained previously, under the conventional law, courts
are directed to authenticate wills based solely on formal
compliance.47 The court’s stated task is purely to evaluate
formal compliance, not to independently assess the will’s
authenticity. However, recognizing that some testators
make mistakes that can undermine the fulfillment of their
intent, courts sometimes overstep the conventional law’s
bounds, deeming wills to be in compliance with the
prescribed formalities even when formal defects are clear.48
probable intent.”).
44. See generally, e.g., Langbein, supra note 10 (explaining why it is
beneficial to allow for some errors in execution if decedent’s intent is clear);
Langbein, supra note 12 (same). For an overview of the reform movement’s
arguments, see generally Glover, supra note 8.
45. See supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text (showing how litigation
has not seemed to increase when applying the harmless error rule).
46. Elsewhere, I have argued that courts should apply the harmless error
rule more consistently and predictably. For a fuller discussion of these
arguments, see generally Glover, supra note 41.
47. See supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text (discussing the importance
of formalities in conventional wills law and the rule of strict compliance).
48. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 7, at 171 (“To avoid . . . harsh
result[s], some courts have occasionally excused or corrected one or another
innocuous defect in execution.”).
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The overreaching of courts within the context of the
harmless error rule is therefore an extension of this
previous overreaching. Now that some courts are authorized
to fulfill the testator’s intent through the harmless error
rule, they have simply found a new frontier through which
to push the limits of the law. Thus, it is both tolerable and
expected that the clear and convincing evidence standard
does not establish a well-defined and impermeable
boundary for the exercise of judicial discretion.
In sum, Baron’s article draws much needed attention to
the tension between the law’s paradigmatic testator, who is
resolute and rational, and the many actual testators, who
are irresolute and irrational. In particular, she persuasively
argues that greater attention should be devoted to how the
law accounts for irresolute testators. As explained above,
however, the harmless error rule’s clear and convincing
evidence standard is not necessarily an appropriate target
for criticism in this regard. Indeed, whatever problems the
clear and convincing evidence standard might have, the
harmless error rule and its clear and convincing evidence
standard are preferable to the conventional law’s rule of
strict compliance.

